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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Volume XXXII November, 1943 Number I
A RATIONALE OF CRIMINAL
NEGLIGENCE
By Roy MORELJAND*
PART I
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
SECTION 1. THE BACKGROUND OF CRIMINAL
NEGLIGENCE
Negligence entered the criminal law as a limitation on the
defense of misadventure.
The rules as to what would amount to misadventure were
gradually evolved. Far into the twelfth century the king de-
cided, in each case, whether life and limb should be spared.'
One who killed another by misadventure or in self defense was
still guilty of a crime in the th.irteenth century,2 although he
* A.B., Transylvania College, 1920; LL.B., University of Ken-
tucky College of Law, 1923; J.D., University of Chicago Law School,
1928; S.J.D., Harvard University, 1942. Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Kentucky College of Law; contributor to various legal
periodicals.
12 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law (1911) 483.
-Cases in the King's Court: "(1214). Roger of Stainton was
arrested because in throwing a stone he by misadventure killed a
girl. And it is testified that this was not by felony. And this was
shown to the king, and the king moved by pity pardoned him the
death. So let him be set free." 1 Seldon Society, Select Pleas of
the Crown (1887) No. 114. "(1225). Mabel, Derwin's daughter, was
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deserved a pardon. Nevertheless, a pardon was necessary3 and
the Statute of Gloucester (1278) regulated the procedure to
be followed in such cases. Since the defense depended upon
royal favor, deterinned rules were, as yet, impossible.
However, certain pmnosples were emerging. Bracton made
a division of the cases based upon the lawfulness or unlawful-
ness of the act. In the latter case the killer was liable. In the
former, blame was not "imputable to him" unless he had failed
to use "due diligence.' '4
This was an over-statement of existing English law. Neg-
ligence was as yet non-existent and Bracton's idea of "due
care" was taken over from the canomsts. 5 But his statement
playing with a stone at Yeovil, and the stone fell on the head of
Walter Critele, but he had no harm from the blow, and a month
after this he died of an infirmity, and she fled to church for fear, but
(the jurors) say positively that he did not die of the blow. There-
fore let her be in custody until the king be consulted." Id. No. 188.
Perkins, A re-examnation of Malice Aforethought (1934) 43 Yale
L. J. 537, 539-541.
12 Pollock & Maitland, op. cit. supra note 1, at 479; 3 Holds-
worth, History of English Law (1923) 259; Id. at 358-359; 3 Id. at
312-313; 3 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (1883)
35-37. And see Cardozo, J., in People v Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 331,
110 N.E. 945, 946 (1915) (dictum).
1 "2 Bracton, De Legibus Angliae (Twiss ed., 1879), c. IV, sec. 2,
pp. 277, 278: By chance, as by misfortune, when a person has pro-
jected a stone against a bird or an animal, and another person
passing unexpectedly is struck and dies. But here it is to be dis-
tingusshed whether a person zs employed upon a lawful or unlawful
work, as if a person has projected a stone towards a place across
which men are accustomed to pass and someone has been
struck this is imputed to his account. But if he was employed
in a lawful work, as if a master is flogging his scholar for the sake
of discipline, or if when a person was casting down hay from a cart
or cutting into a tree and such like, if he had taken as diligent care
as he could, by looking out and by calling out, but not too slowly or
in too low a voice, but in suitable time and with a loud voice, and
so that if anyone were there or were coming there, he ight run
away and take care of himself But if he should be employed
upon a lawful workc, and has not used due diligence, blame shall be
imputable to him. (Italics writer's.)
"At the time Bracton wrote ((1250-1258). Bracton died 1267),
homicide had not yet been divided into its later categories of mur-
der and manslaughter. His distinction between the two situations
described in the above quotation was, therefore, probably not at-
tended by any real difference in purnshment. Perhaps it was this
fact that caused Coke to classify these situations categorically as
murder." Report of Law Rev Com. of N.Y. (1937) 622, n. 241.
Sayre, Mens Rea (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 982-985.
'Id. at 985, note 37; Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts
(1894) 7 Harv. L. Rev. 323, note 4.
In the thirteenth century an increasing emphasis upon the
mental element in crime was noticeable. Bracton's book, written in
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m this instance, as in others, influenced the subsequent develop-
ment of the law. At the turn of the fourteenth century par-
dons came to be granted as a matter of course in the case of
misadventure. 6 The Year Books of Edward IV's and Henry
VII's reigns show that by the middle of the fifteenth century
one could establish the defense by showing that h.e had acci-
dentally killed another, while engaged in a lawful act.7 How-
ever, these cases are vague as to the quality of mind and act
necessary for an "accident."
Coke in Ins Third Institute,s written m the middle of the
seventeenth century, places two.limitations on misadventure. The
death must occur while the accused is doing a lawful act and
he must be without an "evil intent.'' 9 In his discussion of the
second limitation Coke says :10
'Without any evil intent. If a man knowing that many people
come in the street from a Sermon, throw a stone over a wall, in-
tending to fear them, or to give them a slight hurt, and thereupon
one is killed, this is murder; for he had an ill intent, though that
intent extended not to death, and though he knew not the party
slam. For the killing of any by misadventure, or by chance, albeit
it be not felony yet shall he forfeit his Goods and Chattels, to
the intent that men should be so wary to direct their actions, as
they tend not to the effusion of man's blood."
The roots of criminal negligence may be found in this
discussion. Coke, who knew nothing of the term, since the con-
cept was, as yet, unborn, labors to rationalize the limitation.
the middle of the century, indicates the change in attitude. Deeply
influenced by the Roman law and the canomsts, he seized upon this
shift in the principles of criminal liability and emphasized it, often
in his zeal going beyond the actual law of his day in stressing the
mental requisites of criinmality His book exerted a powerful in-
fluence on the subsequent law. 2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit.
supra note 1 at 477; id. at 477, note 4; 2 Holdsworth op. cit. supra,
note 3 at 258-259; 3 id. at 371.
6 "The result of these authorities seems to be that, in the end of
the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth centuries, juries
were bound in cases of trials for homicide, where the defense was
misadventure or self defense, to find specially that such was the
case, upon which the king was bound to grant his pardon." 3 Stephen,
op. cit. supra note 3 at 38.
13 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra, note 3 at 313.
'Coke, Institutes (6th ed. 1680) 56.
9 Ibid. "There is an Homicide that is neither forethought nor
voluntary. As if a man kill another per mfortunium that is
Homicide by misadventure Homicide by misadventure is when
a man does an act, that is not unlawful, which without any evil
intent tendeth to a man's death."
20Id. at 57.
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He states that the man had an "ill (evil) intent." 1 1 Manifestly,
this was not an affirmative intent, since Coke is speaking of
homicide "that is neither forethought nor voluntary " The
hypothetical case of the man who threw a stone over a wall,
causing the death of a passerby, indicates what Coke had i mind.
This was a highly dangerous act. The actor undoubtedly knew
that it might cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to,
some person. Such wanton indifference to human life is the
equivalent of an evil intent (malice),12 and punished in order
that "men should be so wary to direct their actions" that they
"tend not to the effusion of man's blood." Such reasoning
paved the way for the decision in Hull's case,1 3 just ahead, and
the beginnings of negligence in the criminal law.
In Hull's case1 4 several workmen were building a house,
which stood about thirty feet from the highway At the end
of the day's work, Hull was sent to bring down a piece of
timber, lying on the second floor. He called, "Stand clear,"
and then threw the timber, which killed a workman. It was
held not to be manslaughter as the house stood thirty feet from
the highway, and the defendant did what was usual for work-
men to do, giving notice by his shout, so that anyone within the
range of his voice might avoid the danger. 1 5
The decision indicates the point reached in the develop-
ment of the law of misadventure, as well as the beginnings of
negligence. This was a case of "accidental" killing resulting
""By the second half of the seventeenth century, it was um-
versally accepted law that an evil intent was as necessary for felony
as the act itself." Sayre, supra note 4, at 993.
'There is room for a difference of opinion as to whether Coke
considered this to be express or implied malice. Note the discussion,
pro and'con, Report of Law Rev Com., N.Y., op. cit. supra note 4,
at 624, fns. 253 and 254. The difficulty of determining the matter is
indicated by Stephen, op. cit. supra note 3, at 55-56.
"J. Kelyng, 40 (1664).
I4lbid.
"There is dictum in the case that if this were done in the
"streets of London or other populous towns," it would be man-
slaughter notwithstanding the caution given by Hull. Foster, how-
ever, considers that this broad statement is subject to some limita-
tions. "If it were done early in the morning, when few or no people
are stirring, and the ordinary caution is used, I think the party is
excusable. But when the streets are full that will not suffice; for
in the hurry and noise of a crowded street few people hear the
warning or sufficiently attend to it." Fo§ter, Crown Law (2nd ed.
1791) 263.
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from a lawful act. The law was beginning to ask rather defi-
nitely, What lintations should be placed on the word "acci-
dental" in such cases9 The principal case holds that even-
though the act is lawful the case is not an "accident" unless
the actor has taken proper precaution to avoid mischief.
Hale's definition and discussion of misadventure, written
in the latter half of the seventeenth century,1 6 show continued
progress and development. In the definiton 17 itself he does
not add a great deal to the statement of Coke, but increased
particularization in the quality of mind required is indicated
by the fact that he "breaks down" Coke's limitation of "with-
out an evil intent" into the more precise phrase, "without in-
tention of bodily harm to any person."
However, it is in his discussion of a hypothetical case that
Hale really moves forward from the definition and discussion
of Coke and re-introduces a phrase1 s highly important in the
law of negligence .39
"If a carpenter or mason in building casually lets fall a piece of
timber or stone, and kills another (it is by misadventure). But if
he voluntarily lets it fall, whereby it kills another, if he gives not
due warning to those that are under, it will be at least manslaughter;
quia debitan diligentiam non adhibuit." (Italics are ours.)
The phrase may be translated, "because he did not exercise
due care." Tns is a statement of criminal negligence in a
form that is clearly recognizable, there is no mistaking it.
The idea of "due care" was now firmly entrenched in the
criminal law Foster definitely includes the element in his
defmition of "h.omicide by accident"
-20
"Tls species of homicide is where a man is doing a lawful act
without intention of bodily harm to any person, and using proper
caution to prevent danger, unfortunately happeneth to kill." (Italics
are ours).
"Hale, Pleas of the Crown (ed. of 1778) 472.
'7 "Homicide per nfortunsum is, where a man is doing a lawful
act, and without intention of bodily harm to any person, and by that
act death of another ensues." Ibid.
"See page 2, supra.
The phrase is an incorporation of Bracton's idea of "due care."
His influence upon English law in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries was marked. See the discussion, 2 Holdsworth, op. cit.
supra note 3, at pp. 286-291.
" Hale, op. cit. supra note 16, at 472.
'Foster, op. cit. supra note 15, at 258. The definitions of Haw-
kins and Blackstone are not as satisfactory. Neither includes "due
care" as a distinct factor. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown (8th ed.
1824) 85. The first edition was in 1716. 4 Blackstone, Comm.
(Sharswood ed. 1870) star-page 182.
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An examination of his definition indicates that it contains
three distinct factors (1) lawful act, (2) without intention of
bodily harm, and (3) with proper caution to prevent danger.
The requirement that the accused must have been engaged
in a lawful act to render a homicide excusable on the ground
of misadventure was the source of much confusion. Coke's
rule that a death caused by any unlawful act 21 was murder, was
extremely severe. 22 By the time of Foster the rule had been
narrowed to the case where the unlawful act was also malum sn
se.23 If it was committed in the prosecution of a felonious me-
tention, it was murder; in the absence of such intention, it was
manslaughter.
24
The standard used in the early cases to determine whether
the accused had used "proper caution to prevent danger" is
accurately stated by Foster 25 in his discussion of R. v. Ramp-
ton,2 6 decided in 1664. The defendant found a pistol in the
street and tried it with a rammer to see whether it was loaded.
Satisfied that it was not, he pointed it at his wife in sport and
pulled the trigger. She was killed, he was held guilty of man-
slaughter.
Kelyng, who reported the case, was not satisfied with the
decision. 27 Foster expressed a like dissatisfaction.23 He pointed
out that the law did not require "the utmost caution that could
be used." A "reasonable precaution," such as was "usual and
I "If the act be unlawful, it is murder If he had shot at a
Cock or Hen, or other tame fowl of another man's, and the Arrow
by mischance had killed a man, this had been murder, for the act
was unlawful." Coke, op. cit. supra note 8, at 56. Turner, The
Mental Element zn Crnmes at Common Law (1936) 6 Camb. L. J.
31, 42.
Stephen considered Coke's doctrine to be "monstrous." 3 Ste-
phen, op. cit. supra note 3, at 74-75.
'Foster, op. cit. supra note 15, at 258-259.
"Ibid. Although Foster's modification of Coke's doctrine les-
sened its stringency in part, the rule remained severe. The follow-
mg comment by Foster (a modification of the illustration used by
Coke in note 21, supra) will show this. "A shooteth at the poultry
of B, and by accident killeth a man; if his intention was to steal the
poultry, which must be collected from circumstances, it will be
murder by reason of that felonious intent." This appears shocking
in the light of modern rules of criminal liability.
Foster, op. cit. supra note 15, at 264.
Kelyng 41.
I bid., see footnote.
"Foster, op. cit. supra note 15, at 264.
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ordinary i like cases" 29 was the standard. It seemed to hun
that the accused in the Rampton case had satisfied this standard
of care.
It is apparent that ordinary negligence was sufficient for
criminal liability at this time ;30 the requirement of gross negli-
gence was a later development.
The analysis and discussion of Foster carried the develop-
ment of criminal negligence to the latter part of the eighteenth
century The requirement of "due care under the circum-
stances," operating as a limitation on homicide by misadventure,
had become an established part of the law of crimes. It is upon
tins background that the modern cases are projected.
' See the discussion of Sir John Chichester's Case, 1 East, Pleas
of the Crown (1803) 268-269. "It is sufficient that a reasonable
precaution, what is usual and ordinary m like cases, be taken; such
as hath been found by long experience in the course of human affairs
to answer the end." Id. at 266-267.
'See Report of Law Rev. Com., N.Y., op. cit. supra note 4, at
759-761 and authorities cited; Davis, The Development of Negligence
as a Basis for Criminal Liability zn Criminal Homzczde Cases (1938)
26 Ky. L. J. 209, 217.
PART II
THE NATURE AND QUALITY OF CRIMINALLY
NEGLIGENT CONDUCT
SECTION 2. FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS IN
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
What has been the effect of the early development of crinn-
nal negligence upon the modern cases2 This is naturally the
first question that comes to one making a study of the subject.
Has the original analysis been followed, with modifications as
needed, or has it been largely repudiated
What is the standard of care that must be used by the
accused in order that he may be found to have taken "the
proper caution to prevent danger" Is the lawfulness or un-
lawfulness of the act still a basis for dividing the cases * What
is the quality of mind required today,--Is negligence objective
or subjectiveI
One may answer these questions in a general way by say-
ing that throughout all the modern cases there runs a constant
thread of terminology and reasoning bearing unmistakable kin-
ship to the terminology and reasoning in the early cases and
texts. However, certain changes have been drastic. The dis-
cussion which follows will indicate these and attempt to point
out others which seem necessary
Negligence is chiefly important in murder, manslaughter,
and assault and battery Consequently, these will be the only
crimes discussed. Certain problems are fundamental in all
of these. Suppose, for example, that it is decided that negli-
gence is objective rather than subjective. How can tins con-
clusion be reconciled with the fundamental concept of the
criminal law that some type of mens rea is a necessary element
m the imposition of criminal liability 9
Other problems are peculiar to only one or two of the crimes
mentioned. The basis of liability in murder and manslaughter
must be differentiated. A more difficult task lies in marking
the line, admitted to be shadowy, between crinnal and civil
negligence. Is there such a thing as a negligent battery2
Neither the courts nor the text-writers are in accord on these
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matters. Conflicting authorities must be studied and solutions
suggested.
Certain questions have been excluded from the discussion,
although they are often found as contributing factors in negli-
gence cases. Drunkenness is one of these. In many cases the
defendant, who drove a car or handled a gun negligently, was
also drunk or had been drinking. In such cases, although drunk-
enness and negligence are related, drunkenness contains sc many
separate problems that to consider them and their relation to
negligence would unduly prolong the paper. Consequently, a
discussion of this question has tfeen omitted, except in the case
of the negligent murder where intoxication raises a special prob-
lem. Similar considerations have led to the exclusion of such
questions as causation, ignorance or mistake of law or fact, and
the responsibility of corporations or others for the acts of
employees.
One of the most difficult and controversial problems in the
law of negligence relates to the standard of care which shall be
used in determining whether the accused has sufficiently met the
requirement that he must have taken proper caution to prevent
danger in order to avoid criminal liability
Two standards have been formulated by the courts and
legislatures in negligence cases. The first, gross negligence, is
the standard in the majority of jurisdictions.3 1 Gross negil-
gence has been defined as "such a departure from what would
be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent man under the same
circumstances as to furnish evidence of that indifference to
consequences winch in some cases takes the place of crininal
intent.' 32 The other, the tort standard applied to criminal law,
is followed in a few jurisdictions. It may be defined as "the
degree of care which an ordinarily prudent man would use
under like circumstances. "33 These two standards will be dis-
cussed in reverse order.
'The standard m each state will be found summarized in an
appendix to an article, Riesenfeld, Negligent Homcde-A Study in
Statutory Interpretation (1936) 25 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 37.
'Fitzgerald v. State, 112 Ala. 34, 20 So. 966 (1895).
'Harper, Torts (1933) sec. 69. Nail v. State, 33 Okla. Cr. 100,
242 Pac. 270 (1926) State v. Gilliam, 66 S.C. 419, 45 S.E. 6 (1903);
Young v. State, 120 Tex. Cr. Rep. 39, 41, 47 S.W (2d) 320, 321
(1932) (note Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 1936) (Penal Code) c. 14, art. 1233);
Clemens v. State, 176 Wis. 289, 185 N.W 209 (1921).
SECTION 3. THE TORT STANDARD OF CARE
A. JURISDICTIONS WHICH CONTAIN DECISIONS APPLYING IT
Although some of the early commentators did not attempt
to formulate a standard, 34 numerous statements in early com-
mon law discussions indicate that criminal negligence in man-
slaughter at that time meant merely lack of ordinary care.35
Although the majority of jurisdictions in the United States
have repudiated that standard today, decisions in several states
are commonly cited as subscribing to the tort standard of care.
1. Texas
Texas is outstanding among the jurisdictions that have
accepted the tort standard of care. The tort standard has been
adopted by statute in that state in the case of homicide by neg-
ligence. The provision is as follows .36
"The want of proper care and caution distinguishes this offense
from excusable homicide. The degree of care and caution is such
as a man of ordinary prudence would use under like circumstances."
Eighteen years ago the court construed this provision m
Haynes v. State,3 7 holding that "the degree of care and caution
which a man of ordinary prudence would use under like cir-
cumstances is the statutory definition in such cases" and
therefore the standard of care to be followed.
The court affirmed this interpretation in 1932 and added.
"It may be doubted if there is greater unanimity among the
courts of all jurisdictions upon any one thing than in the gen-
eral definition of negligence, as being a failure to do what a man
of ordinary care and prudence would do under the same or like
circumstances. " 38
Hale discussed specific cases where the accused was held guilty
of involuntary manslaughter because of "lack of due care" but made
no attempt to define it. Hale, op. cit. supra note 16, at 471-478.
' See the text and footnotes, supra, at pp. 6-7. Indeed, Foster,
an acknowledged authority, remonstrated against certain contem-
poraneous manslaughter convictions based, it seemed to him, upon
a standard of care that was higher than "ordinary care" under the
circumstances. Foster, op. cit. supra note 15, at 263-265.
'Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 1936) (Penal Code) c. 14, art. 1233.
88 Tex. Cr. Rep. 42, 224 S.W 1100 (1920).
Young v. State, 120 Tex. Cr. Rep. 39, 41, 47 S.W (2d) 320,
321 (1932)
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This is an interesting assertion in view of the fact that there
is a decided lack of unanimity among the courts in applying
this standard in criminal cases. The authorities cited in support
of the statement are cvil cases. Great unanimity among the
courts of all jurisdictions does prevail in the interpretation of
negligence on that side of the docket. Apparently the court is
emphasizing the fact that it has taken over the civil standard
completely in the case of negligent homicide.
2. South Carolina
There is a line of cases in South Carolina subscribing to the
rule that in manslaughter by the negligent use of a deadly
weapon the standard is that of ordinary care under the cir
cumstances, and that to support a verdict a lack of care amount-
ing to recklessness or gross negligence is not necessary The
rule was first promulgated in State v. Gilliam3 9 and that case
remains the leading decision in the series. In State v. Han-
ahan4o the rule was extended to the negligent operation of auto-
mobiles. Another line of decisions in the state is more or less at
variance with the above rule and with the cases which support
it. The first of these is State v Davis.41 That case held that
simple negligence would not support a conviction of man-
slaughter. It is apparent from the opinion that the court
- 66 S.C. 419, 45 S.E. 6 (1903) The defendant was tried for
the murder of his wife. He sought to explain the killing by showing
that it happened unintentionally in a playful tussle between them
for the possession of a pistol. The trial 3udge charged on negligent
homicide, adopting the tort standard of care. Gilliam excepted to
the charge on the ground that it was in conflict with the law as to
manslaughter by negligence. The appellate court overruled the
exception.
Seven years later the principles of law in relation to the negli-
gent handling of a gun enunciated in State v. Gilliam were affirmed
in State v. Revels, 86 S.C. 213, 68 S.E. 523 (1910). Accord: State v.
McCalla, 101 S.C. 303, 85 SE. 720 (1915). In the McCalla case
Watts, J., dissented on the ground that gross negligence, not ordi-
nary negligence, was necessary to convict. In State v. Tucker, 86
S.C. 211, 68 S.E. 523 (1910), the court's instructions were substan-
tially the same as in the Gilliam case. Tucker excepted to the
charge. The appellate court reaffirmed the instructions given in that
case and overruled the exceptions in the instant case. Accord: State
v Badgett, 87 S.C. 543, 70 S.E. 301 (1911)
40 111 S.C. 58, 96 S.E. 667 (1918)
1128 S.C. 265, 122 SE. 770 (1924). The defendant clained that
the injury which caused the death of the deceased, his wife, was
caused when he stumbled over a chair in attempting to carry her
to a bed when she fell in an epileptic seizure.
KENTUcKY LAW JOURNAL
intended to follow the majority rule, which requires gross
negligence. That rule was quoted verbatim from Corpus
Jurs, 4 2 although the court placed certain limitations upon it. 43
State v Williams44 was the next decision in this series. In
that case the court instructed. "It is manslaughter when it is
more than a mere accident." This was held to be reversible
error. The appellate court pointed out that the instruction in-
eluded "ordinary care and negligence," winch the case of: State
v Davis had held to be insufficient.
A choice between, or a reconciliation of, the conflicting
principles enunciated in State v Gilliam and State v. Davis was
inevitable. The case of State v. QUIek,45 the last in the series
supporting State v. Gilhiam, attempted to meet the issue. The
defendant was indicted for murder and found guilty of in-
voluntary manslaughter. She admitted that she shot the de-
ceased with a pistol, a deadly weapon, but pleaded accidental
homicide. The court reviewed in detail the South Carolina de-
cisions, reaffirmed its position that the standard of care in such
cases is the care that an "ordinarily careful" man would use, and
concluded that it knew of no decision of the court changing that
rule. So, undoubtedly, State v. Gifliam is still law in South
Carolina. However, the defendant had relied upon State v
Davis and it was necessary to differentiate the two cases. This
the court did by pointing out that the use of a deadly weapon
was not involved in the Davis case.4 6
"29 Corpus Jurs (1922) 1154. However, had the justice ex-
amined carefully the footnotes to the same page from which he
quoted, he would have found State v. Gilliam, 66 S.C. 419, 45 S.E. 6
(1903), cited as defining negligence as the want of ordinary care.
" "There may be circumstances connected with the homicide,
such as the situation of the parties, the character of the instrumen-
tality carelessly handled, and others, which may convert an act,
otherwise one of simple negligence, into gross or reckless negligence,
and justify a conviction of manslaughter or even murder; but it was
manifest error to charge that in every instance, regardless of the
circumstances, an act of ordinary negligence will constitute man-
slaughter." State v. Davis, 128 S.C. 265, 122 S.E. 770, 771 (1924)
"131 S.C. 294, 127 S.E. 264 (1925) Accord: State v. Cameron,
137 S.C. 371, 135 S.E. 364 (1926) See the dissenting opinion in State
v. Sussewell, 149 S.C. 128, 146 S.E. 697 (1929).
"168 S.C. 7.6, 167 S.E. 19 (1932).
"State v Hanahan, 111 S.C. 58, 96 S.E. 667 (1918), which ex-
tended the rule in the Gilliam case to the negligent operation of an
automobile, was not mentioned in the decision. The Hanahan case
seems to be the only automobile case, involving a conviction of man-
slaughter for negligent homicide, that has reached the appellate
court.
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The result seems to be that ordinary negligence in dealing
with a gun or an automobile (dangerous agencies) is sufficient
to support a verdict of manslaughter in South Carolina.47 In
all other situations48 gross negligence is required.
3. Oklahoma
In Oklahoma it is manslaughter in the second degree to kill
a human being by "culpable negligence.' 4 9 The tort standard
of care has been adopted in the interpretation of "culpable neg-
ligence" as nsed, in this statute.50  Thus, in Herndon v. State,5
the court in defining the degree of negligence sufficient to con-
vict of manslaughter in the second degree said. "Culpable negli-
gence is the omission to do something which a reasonable and
prudent person would do, or the doing of something which such
a person would not do under the circumstances surrounding the
particular case." 5
2
There is, however, a curious anomaly in a number of the
Oklahoma decisions. Although the tort standard of care is used
in defining "culpable negligence", as used in the statute, the
court has confused it with gross negligence. Herndon v. State5 3
will illustrate. In that case the tort standard of care was ap-
plied. The court, however, quoted from a case, and apparently
" This rule should be compared with the quotation from State v.
Davis, 128 S.C. 265, 122 S.E. 770 (1924), cited note 43, supra, and
Held v. Com., 183 Ky. 209, 208 SAW 772 (1919). The Davis case
suggests and the Held case holds that the want of ordinary care is
gross negligence where a gun is being handled in the presence of
others, or an automobile is being driven on a crowded thoroughfare
in a city. It is submitted that South Carolina is really applying the
standard of gross negligence in all cases, since the want of ordinary
care with a dangerous instrumentality under such circumstances
amounts to gross negligence. See the discussion, infra.
And see the instruction which the appellate court of South Carolina
affirmed in State v. Quick, 168 S.C. 76, 167 S.E. 19, 20 (1932).
"Such, for example, as the situation in State v. Davis, 128 S.C.
265, 122 S.E. 770 (1924), cited supra note 41.
""Any killing of one human being by the act, procurement or
culpable negligence of another, winch under the provisions of this
chapter is not murder, nor manslaughter in the first degree, nor
excusable nor justifiable homicide, is manslaughter in the second
degree." Okla. Comp. Laws (1931) sec. 2228.
'Kent v. State, 8 Okla. Cr. 188, 126 Pac. 1040 (1912), Pamplin
v. State, 21 Okla. Cr. 136, 205 Pac. 521 (1922), Clark v. State, 27
Okla. Cr. 11, 224 Pac. 738 (1924), Rommes v. State, 45 Okla. Cr. 40,
281 Pac. 310 (1929). Note (1930) 28 Mfich. L. Rev. 933, 934.
'38 Okla. Cr. 338, 261 Pac. 378 (1927).
"Id. at 379.
Ibid.
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adopted a statement to the effect that the law is regardful of
human life and if one ts grossly and wantonly reckless 'n ex-
posng others to danger, he will be held responsible for resulting
injuries. The court was confusing the two standards and ap-
parently trying to use both, winch is an impossibility
The court was in even greater error in Nail v. State.5 4 The
case definitely adopts the tort standard. However, the opinion
apparently makes a distinction of degree between civil and crinm-
nal negligence.
Such inconsistencies in the Oklahoma decisions are hard to
explain. It is believed, however, that the state is definitely com-
mitted to the tort standard of care in the interpretation of "cul-
pable negligence" and that such allusions to the other standard
are inadvertent.
4. Wisconsin
Clemens v State,5 5 a Wisconsin case, is commonly cited as
illustrative of the minority rule. This decision involved the in-
terpretation of a statute which made the killing of a human being
by culpable negligence manslaughter in the fourth degree. The
appellate court held that "culpable negligence" as used in this
statute meant "ordinary negligence" "Ordinary negligence"
as defined by the court was a "want of that care and prudence
that the great mass of mankind exercises under the same or
similar circumstances. "6
It is important to note, however, that in 1929 the word
"gross" was inserted in the statute in lieu of "culpable" by
legislative action.5 7 Following that action the appellate court,
in State v Whatley,5 s held that under the present statute the
defendant's conduct must be more reprehensible than mere
want of ordinary care, "in that there must be on his part either
a willful intent to injure, or that reckless and wanton disregard
of the rights and safety of another or his property, winch the
law deems equivalent to an intent to injure.'' 59 It may be
133 Okla. Cr. 100,. 242 Pac. 270 (1926). See the comment on
this case, Riesenfeld, supra note 31, at 39.
1176 Wis. 289, 185 N.W 209 (1921)
5Id. at 212.
5'Wis. Stat. (1929) sec. 340.26.
210 Wis. 157, 245 N.W 93 (1932).
'Id. at 96.
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concluded that Clemens v. State and the tort standard of care
have been definitely repudiated in Wisconsin by this statute.60
5. Missourn
There are a number of cases in Mlissouri winch adopt the
tort standard of care in defining "culpable negligence" as used
in a statute on fourth degree manslaughter. 61
The first case of importance was Emery v. State.62 The
definition used by the court 63 was lifted bodily from Shearman &
Redfield on Negligence, an authority on civil negligence. How-
ever, the decision had a far-reaching effect on subsequent cases.
The tort standard of care as enunciated in the Emery case
was affirmed in State v. Horner 64
In State v Weisman,65 the phrase, "by reason of which
omission or act another person is directly endangered in life or
bodily safety" was added to the definition. Two civil cases were
among the supporting authorities. 66
Then came State v. Millin,67 winch completely repudiated
the standard of care as enunciated in the earlier decisions. In
instructing the jury the trial court used the definition of cul-
pable negligence adopted in the Emery case and affirmed in
the series of subsequent decisions just discussed. The appellate
court held, however, that such instructions fell short of sub-
e0Christie v. State, 212 Wis. 136, 248 N.W 920 (1933). See
Gausewitz, Work of the Wisconsin Supreme Court: Crmrnal Law
(1933) 9 Wis. L. Rev. 21.
'1 Rev. Stat. Mo. (1879) sec. 1250; now Rev. Stat. Mo. (1929)
sec. 3988.
-78 Mo. 77 (1888).
"Culpable negligence is the omission to do something which
a reasonable, prudent and honest man would do, or the doing some-
thing which such a man would not do under all the circumstances
surrounding each particular case." Id. at 80.
-266 Mo. 109, 180 S.W 873 (1915). The court cited Wharton
on Homicide as supporting authority. It is true that Wharton does
support the tort standard of care in section 445 but he inconsistently
adopts the requirement of gross negligence in section 446. Wharton,
Homicide (3rd ed. 1907) secs. 445, 446. _
. 256 S.W (Mo. Sup.) 740 (1923).
'Jackson v. Bell Tel. Co., 281 Mo. 358, 219 S.W 655 (1920),
Gilbert v. Hilliard (Mo. App.) 222 S.W 1027 (1920).
-318 Mo. 553, 300 S.W 694 (1927).
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mitting to the jury a correct definition of culpable negligence.
The court said:
68
"The definition of culpable negligence heretofore approved in
State v. Weisman and other cases is mere negligence, such as would
be actionable in a civil suit, whereby life or limb is directly endan-
gered. Culpable negligence, as used inour statute means some-
thing more than this."
The court laid down the rule that before a person could be
convicted of manslaughter by culpable negligence under the
statute it was necessary not only that death ensued from the
negligent act or omission but "there must be facts and circum-
stances in evidence tending to prove that suchl person was actu-
ated at the time by a reckless disregard of the consequences of
his act. "
6 9
The standard of care in Missouri has been gross negligence,
since the Millin case. In State v. Baublits,70 decided in 1930,
the court stated its present position on the rule quite clearly
' There is a marked distinction between simple or ordinary
negligence, giving one a right of action for damages, and culpable
negligence, rendering one guilty of a criminal offense. Culpable
negligence is tantamount to gross carelessness or recklessness in-
compatible with a proper regard for human life."
It is submitted that the tort standard of care is used in
only four states in defining criminal negligence. It has been
adopted by statute in Texas in the case of negligent homicide
and by the courts in Oklahoma in the interpretation of "cul-
pable negligence" as used in a statute on manslaughter in the
second degree. In addition, the courts in Michlgan and Cali-
forma have construed certain negligent homicide statutes in
those jurisdictions as requiring no more than ordinary negli-
gence.70 All other jurisdictions have repudiated it with the
exception of South Carolina, which, although it subscribes to
the tort standard in the case of certain dangerous agencies, is,
in reality, applying a standard which amounts to gross negli-
gence.
71
B. REASONS FoR ITs REJECTION iN THE MAJORITY o' STATES
What are the reasons for the repudiation of the early com-
mon law standard of "ordinary care" by most jurisdictions9
Id. at 697.
Ibid.
324 Mo. 1199, 27 S.W (2d) 16 (1930)
, See notes 540, 541, and 642, infra.
See n. 47 supra.
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The rejection of the tort standard seems to be based, pri-
marily, upon the reason, first suggested by Foster, 72 that to make
criminal liability for manslaughter coincident with civil liability
for negligence would be too harsh. It would raise the threat of
criminal liability upon every member of the community, any one
of whom might at any time find hinself in the circumstance of
having committed an act of ordinary negligence. 7 3 "Accidents
of this lamentable lind may be the lot of even the wisest and
best of manlind."
'74
The following cases will illustrate. A, a law-abiding citizen,
usually prudent and careful in his conduct, is driving his auto-
mobile slowly down the street. He casually turns to wave to a
friend whom he sees on the sidewalk The car hits a person and
fatally injures him, an injury which would not have occurred
if A had not turned his head.
In another casd, B is driving his car through the mid-town
business section at a rate of speed ikely to be dangerous to
""I cannot help saying, that the rule of law I have been con-
sidering in this place, touching the consequence of taking or not
taking due precaution, doth not seem to be sufficiently tempered
with mercy. Manslaughter was formerly a capital offense, as I
shall hereafter show; and even the forfeiture of goods and chattels
upon the foot of the present law is an heavy stroke upon a man,
guilty, it is true, of an heedless incautious conduct, but in other
respects perfectly innocent. And where the rigour of law bor-
dereth upon injustice, mercy should, if possible, interpose in the ad-
numstration. It is not the part of judges to be perpetually hunting
after forfeitures, where the heart zs free from guilt. They are mnm-
isters appointed by the Crown for the ends of publick justice; and
should have written on their hearts the solemn engagement his
Majesty is under 'to cause law and justice zn mercy to be executed
in all his judgments.'
"I have been the longer upon this case, because accidents of
this lamentable kind may be the lot of the wisest and the best of
mankind, and most commonly fall amongst the nearest friends and
relations; and in such a case the forfeiture of goods, rigorously
exacted, would be heaping affliction upon the head of the afflicted,
and galling an heart already wounded past cure. It would even
aggravate the loss of a brother, a parent, a child, or wife, if such a
loss under such circumstances is capable of aggravation." Foster,
op. cit. supra note 15, at 264-265.
"Report of Law Rev. Com., N.Y., op. cit. supra n. 4, at 247.
Cf: "It would seem that, according to the rationale of the case, in
our complex state of society, where there are so many instrumentali-
ties which, if not carefully used will cause death, the threat of civil
liability is not enough to act as a deterrent, and that the sanctions
of society must be inposed on those who do not use reasonable care
in order that the citizens of the state may be reasonably free from
bodily harm at the hands of its careless individuals." Davis, supra
note 30, at 223.
1 Foster, op. cit. supra n. 15, at 264.
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human life and safety The car is full of young people, all
slightly under the influence of liquor, hilarious and gay The
driver, without slowing down, turns and waves to a young
friend on the sidewalk. The car hits a man and kills him.
Should the criminal law punish one of these men and not
the other 2 Both were guilty of incautious conduct and in each
case it led to the death of an innocent person.
A is guilty of ordinary negligence and therefore liable
civilly To adopt the tort standard in crimes would, of neces-
sity, result in holding the defendant guilty in the case of every
crime for which a parallel tort exists. So, under the tort stand-
ard, A would also be subject to criminal liability However, it
is to be doubted whether he is guilty of gross negligence.7 5 B 's
guilty of gross negligence.
The difference in the two cases lies in the difference in the
degree of negligence. This difference in degree has two im-
portant aspects to the general public and to those who admin-
ister the criminal law.
First, the probability of harm is much greater in the second
case. It is not so likely that an accident will happen in the
first case, the danger of societal harm is slight. An accident is
likely to happen under the circumstances in the second case, the
danger of societal harm is great.76
Second, any good citizen is likely to find himself in A's
situation at any time. When this is considered in connection
with the fact that accidents under such circumstances are rather
unlikely, there is strong argument for refusing to impose crim-
inal liability
On the other hand, most good citizens do not consider it
likely that they will find themselves in circumstances such as
B's at any time.77 When this is considered in connection with
"See Regina v Noakes, 4 F & F 920 (1866) and the fn. to the
case, where it is stated that the defendant was liable in tort for
his negligent act. See also, Rex v. Greisman (1926) 4 D.L.R. 738,
741.
" See the discussion, Wechsler and Michael, A Rationale of the
Law of Homiczde (1938) 37 Col. L. Rev. 701, 721-723; id. at 742-751.
1 In connection with the discussion in the text consider the fol-
lowing statement from Rex v. Bateman, 19 Cr. App. R. 8 (1925)"
"To establish criminal liability the facts must be such that, in the
opinion of the jury, the negligence went beyond a mere matter of
compensation between subjects and showed such disregard for the
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the fact that danger of societal harm is great under such cir-
cumstances, there is strong argument for criminal liability
A number of other considerations have influenced the courts
and legislatures m their refusal to adopt the tort standard of
care m criminal negligence. It seems to be generally considered
that its adoption would not materially improve the carefulness
of the majority of mdividuals.7s Therefore, the deterrent effect
of the increased liability would not be commensurate with the
suffering and humiliation inflicted upon those convicted and
their families under the higher standard.
It is believed that juries would not convict even though the
tort standard were the law, especially if imprisonment were me-
volved m a verdict of guilty The only effective alternative to
imprisonment is a fine. What would that add to the present
liability for money by way of compensation to the injured party
or his personal representative9 If the payment of money will
deter the potential wrongdoer, his civil liability in tort will have
sufficient deterrent effect.
life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State
and conduct deserving punishment." (Italics are writer's). The
conduct of B falls within this rule; the conduct of A does not.
I "The requirement of 'gross' negligence rather than ordinary
negligence in manslaughter cases seems satisfactory, for criminal
pumshment does not often deter ordinary negligence, and the de-
terrence of such negligent acts would seem to be the only reason
to support criminal punishment." Note (1930) 28 Mich. L. Rev.
933, 934.
SECTION 4. THE NEED FOR A DEFINITION OF
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
The rejection of the tort standard of care7 9 presents the
critical problem of defining the extra degree of negligence requi-
site to criminal liability The courts have experienced great
difficulty in solving this problem.
There are those who believe that a satisfactory definition of
the term as used in the criminal law is impossible. The footnote
to Regina v .Noakess ° is the classic example of this defeatist
attitude
"The case is certainly of some practical importance as affording
a remarkable illustration of that which it has too often been said
cannot be defined, and can only be defined by means of illustrations,
viz:-culpable or criminal negligence. It is impossible to define it,
and it is not possible to make the distinction between actionable
negligence and criminal negligence intelligible, except by means of
illustrations drawn from actual judicial opinons."'1
As capable an authority as Stephen states-that no one is
able to say how much more carelessness is required to create
criminal liability than civil: It is "more" but no one can say
"how much more" "No rule exists in such cases. It is a mat-
ter of degree determined by the view the jury happen to take in
each particular case.'82
I See the discussion, supra, pp. 10-19. Note the summary on
p. 16.
84 F- & F 920, 176 Eng. Rep. 849 (1866).
"Id. at 921.
"'In order that homicide by omission may be crimnal, the
omission must amount to what is sometimes called gross, and some-
times culpable negligence. There must be more, but no one can
say how much more, carelessness than is required in order to create
a civil liability. For instance, many railway accidents are caused
by a momentary forgetfulness or want of presence of mind, which
are sufficient to involve the railway in civil liability, but are not
sufficient to make the railway servant guilty of manslaughter if
death is caused. No rule exists in such cases. It is a matter of
degree determined by the view the jury happen to take in each
particular case." 3 Stephen, op. cit. supra n. 3, at 11.
"In some cases the attempt to elucidate the principles to be
applied is abandoned and the question of what is to be done with
the person in the dock is handed over to the jury who are left, with-
out any proper guidance, to come to a decision under any chance
influences or prejudices that may happen ,to be operating at the
moment in their minds--even such as may be aroused by the -per-
sonal appearance of the prisoner, his calling, demeanor, or social
position." Turner, supra note 21, at 40.
THE INEED FOR A -DEFINITION OF- CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE 21
Acquiescence in Stephen's view that the extra amount of
negligence necessary to create crminal liability is a matter of
degree, incapable of precise definition, and that therefore
whether it exists to such a degree in a particular criminal case
is largely a matter for the jury is found in a number of .cases.8 3
Such a solution to the problem must be rejected as unten-
able. It is doubtful whether those who have advocated it realize
its implications. On its face, it advocates going practically the
whole way and simply asking the jury whether the defendant's
conduct ought to be classed as criminal under the facts of the
particular case.
A. THE RELATION OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE TO THE
SU3STANTIVE PROBLEM
This requires facing the question of the jury's function in
criminal cases. In a few states the jury is the judge of the law
as well as the facts, 4 but in most jurisdictions all questions of
law are decided by the court8 5 and all questions of fact by the
I "The degree of negligence in such a case that would make a
man criminally responsible can hardly be defined. It is not a slight
failure in duty that would render hn criminally negligent, but a
great failure undoubtedly would. The line between the two ex-
tremes is hard to define, and is a question that must be left to a great
extent in each individual case to the common sense of the trial
jury. It is for them to determine whether or not the degree of
failure of duty is in fact crmunal." Stehr v. State, 92 Neb. 755, 139
N.W 676 (1913). Accord: Hampton v. State, 50 Fla. 55, 39 So. 421
(1905), State v. Lester, 127 inn. 282, 149 N.W 297 (1914)
s For example, in the following statutes it is provided that the
jury shall be judges of the law and the facts: Ga. Penal Code (1933)
sec. 1059; ll. State Bar Stat. (1935) c. 38, sec. 764; La. Code Cr.
Pr. (1929) art. 383. See Clark, Crim. Proc. (2nd ed. 1918) 542-546.
"We have said that, being judges of the law and the fact,
the jury are not bound by the law, as given to them by the court,
but can assume the responsibility of deciding, each juror for him-
self, what the law is. If they can say, upon their oaths, that they
know the law better than the court, they have the power so to
do. If they are prepared to say that the law is different from what
it is declared to be by the court, they have a perfect legal right
to say so and find the verdict according to their own notions of
the law. It is a matter between their consciences and their God,
with which no power can interfere The jury were not bound
to take the law as 'laid down' to them by the court, but had the
undoubted right to decide it for themselves, and in refusing so
to declare the court erred." Fisher v The People, 23 Ill. 218, 231
(1859). See article, Harker, The Illino=s Juror sn the Trzal of Crim-
inal Cases (1911) 5 Ill. L. "Rev. 468.
'It is provided by statute in a number of states, however,
that on a trial for libel, the jury has the right to determine the
law and the facts. See A.L.I. Code of Crnn. Proc., page 964.
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jury 86 The jury applies the law as given to it by the courts T
to the facts. The court cannot evade its responsibility to in-
struct on the law of the case by passing the problem to the
jury
Nor has the court satisfactorily fulfilled this responsibility
unless the instructions which it gives actually illumine the law
for the jury If the jury is to be intelligently guided by the
instructions, it is necessary that the court state the law clearly.
This means not only that it be stated in language that the jury
can understand, but also that it be stated, as nearly as possible,
with certainty. The less precise the judge's instructions, the
wider the law-making function of the jury Judges realize that
instructions on criminal negligence have not been sufficiently
precise. However, the great majority of them have no inten-
tion of leaving the substantive question of negligence to the
jury
Moreover, even though judges were to evade their respon-
sibility in the case of the instructions and pass the negligence
issue to the jury, their problem would not be solved.
The question of negligence arises in other ways. The de-
fendant may demur to the indictment8 8 or information 9 or
move to quash9° on the ground that it does not charge an of-
fense, one element of which is the criminal negligence of the
defendant. The court must decide whether, as a matter of law,
negligence is alleged.
IId. at 962-964; Clark, op. cit. supra note 84, at 543-546. In
Sparf and Hansen v. U. S., 156 U. S. 51 (1895), the question is con-
sidered at great length and numerous cases are reviewed.
'Even in those jurisdictions where the jury is judge of both
law and facts, the judge is not released from his duty and obli-
gation of instructing as to what the law ss. The jury has the power
to determine the law over the head of the court, but that does not
prevent the court from telling the jury what the law is and the
importance of following it as enunciated.
'State v. Hardister and Brown, 38 Ark. 605 (1882), Hayes v.
State, 138 Ga. 457, 75 S.E. 523 (1912); State v. Lester, 127 Minn.
282, 149 N.W 297 (1914).
'Mayse v. State, 38 Okla. Cr. 144, 259 Pac. 277 (1927), Ansley
v. State, 44 Okla. Cr. 382, 281 Pac. 160 (1929); Rommes v. State, 45
Okla. Cr. 40, 281 Pac. 310 (1929)
1Cannon v State, 91 Fla. 214, 107 So. 360 (1926), People v.
Falkovitch, 280 Ill. 321, 117 N.E. 398 (1917), State v. Bailey, 107
Kan. 741, 193 Pac. 354 (1920). In State v. Whatley, 210 Wis. 157,
245 N.W 93 (1932) the State appealed from an order sustaining
the defendant's plea in abatement to the information.
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The question of negligence presents itself m a number of
ways in connection with the evidence. During the course of the
trial the question may arise as to whether certain proposed tes-
timony tends to show criminal negligence.9 1 In some states
the defendant may demur to the evidence. 9 2 Or he may con-
tend that it is insufficient to authorize the submission of the
case to the jury 9 3 After a verdict for the state, the defendant
may move for a new trial on the ground that the evidence is in-
sufficient to support the verdict.
9 4
After conviction, the defendant may again test the suf-
ficiency of the indictment or information 9 5 or reach other de-
fects apparent on the face of the record 9 6 by a motion in arrest
of judgment. If there is an appeal, the scene of action shifts to
the appellate court which will either approve or disapprove of
the trial judge's-action in dealing with the negligence issue.
A glance back at the'various stages where the issue of negli-
gence may arise in the trial of a criminal case containing that
factor indicates the futility of any attempt to evade the sub-
stantive problem of criminal negligence by the trial judge. It
may come to the surface at several places in the proceedings.
9 7
"People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148 N.W 400 (1914) 'People
v. Harris, 214 Mich. 145, 182 N.W 673 (1921), State v. Vines, 93
N.C. 493, 53 Am. Rep. 466 (1885), State v. Miller, 119 Ore. 409,
243 Pac. 72 (1926); State v. Ramos, 159 Wash. 599, 294 Pac. 223
(1930).
"-State v. Weisman,- Mo.- 256 S.W 740 (1923) State
v. Winkler, 309 Mo. 28, 273 S.W 1040 (1925) (dictum), State v.
Scheufler, - Mo. -, 285 S.W 419 (1926), State v. Sawyers,
336 Mo. 644, 80 S.W (2d) 164 (1935).
'State v. Homer, 266 Mo. 109, 180 S.W 873 (1915), State v.
Millin, 318 Mo. 553, 300 S.W 694 (1927), State v. Murphy, 324 Mo.
183, 23 S.W (2d) 136 (1929) State v. Melton, 326 Mo. 962, 33 S.W
(2d) 894 (1930), State v. Rountree, 181 N.C. 500, 106 S.E. 669
(1921). See State v. Watson, 216 Mo. 420, 115 S.W 1011 (1909).
"Foy v. State, 40 Ga. App. 617, 150 S.W 917 (1929), Dunville
v. State, 188 Ind. 373, 123 N.E. 689 (1919), State v. Kuum, 55 Mont.
436, 178 Pac. 288 (1919), Ford v. State, 71 Neb. 246, 98 N.W 807
(1904), State v. Rountree, 181 N.C. 500, 106 S.E. 669 (1921), Herndon
v. State, 38 Okla. Cr. 338, 261 Pac. 378 (1927), Goodman v. Com.,
153 Va. 943, 151 SE. 168 (1930)
'5Madding v. State, 118 Ark. 506, 177 S.W 410 (1915), People
v. Buddenseick, 103 N.Y. 487, 9 N.E. 44 (1886); Reddick v. State,
- Tex. Cr. App. -, 47 S.W 993 (1898)
Overby v. State, 115 Ga. 240, 41 S.E. 609 (1902).
'Leon Green points out that the negligence issue may come
to the surface at any one or more of five possible stages m a czvil
case. At four of these it demands the judgment of the judge; at
the other, that of the jury. Green, The Negligence Issue (1928)
37 Yale L. J. 1029, 1031.
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Even though the judge might desire to shun his responsibility
m the case of the instructions and, as a practical matter, pass
the negligence issue largely to the jury through instructions
which were not sufficiently precise, he would be forced to meet
the problem personally and directly m the other instances.,
When is an indictment or information which charges an
offense of which negligence is an element sufficient as a matter
of law? What, from the standpoint of the admissibility of evi-
dence, is the nature and quality of acts tending to show negli-
gence' What circumstances will justify a directed verdict for
the defendant' What considerations should guide the judge in
commenting on the evidence in jurisdictions which allow him to
do so 9 What must be shown before the defendant may demand
a new trial on the ground that the evidence does not support
the verdict? The answer to such questions requires a precise
knowledge of what constitutes criminal negligence.
SECTION 5. A DEFINITION OF CRIMINAL
NEGLIGENCE
A. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN FORMULATING A DEFINITION
It would be futile for the law to attempt to deal in advance
by specific detailed rule with each possible instance of negligent
conduct. 98  This is because the number of situations where
negligence could be an issue is incalculable.
The objective circumstances alone present limitless possi-
bilities for negligent conduct. The number of dangerous sn-
strumentalities, such as automobiles, guns, and poisons, is large.
An enumeration of all possible dangerous situations-slippery
streets, crowded buildings, and overloaded boats-is beyond the
province of the law.
The subjective circumstances offer equal possibilities. The
qualities of personality are themselves various, their shadings
countless. There is a wide range of mental phenomena, like
.memory, observation, skill and self-control. Phystcal qualities
are equally multiple. Variations of bodily characteristics, nor-
mal and abnormal, such as age, strength, blindness, and deafness,
are endless in number.
Possible combinations of all these circumstances, objective
and subjective, are literally infinite. One has only to unleash
his imagination for a moment to see a host of old men with
rheumatism trying to cross crowded thoroughfares, drunken
drivers speeding defective automobiles through throngs of in-
different children, inexperienced youngsters recklessly burning
leaves on lots located in populous communities, and so on ad
Infinitum.
Faced with such infinity, cognizant of the utter impossibil-
ity of formulating specific rules for individual situations, the
'The law does measure conduct by definife standards in a
relatively small number of situations. "These instances are largely
confined to police regulations as the 'Stop, Look and Listen' rule,
speed limits, sale of poisons, and the like. In these cases precision
of conduct is highly desirable. But even here the possible situa-
tions are so many that the integrity of those hard and fast rules is
not infrequently violated. See Hinton v. Southern R. Co., 172 N.C.
587, 90 SX.. 786 (1916), Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. Roberts,
130 Va. 532, 107 S.E. 838 (1921)." Green, op cit. supra note 97, at 1029.
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law, on the civil side, has adopted a formula for negligence.9 9
Like all such machinery, the formula is abstractly stated, so that
it does not fit exactly to the facts of particular cases. However,
it permits the problems of individual cases to be "worked down"
to a graspable position by judges and juries. Similar machinery
is common in the sciences, and it is practically necessary for
solving detailed, intricate problems in any field.
Te formula, variously worded in the texts and cases, is
phrased substantially as follows in the Restatement of Torts :100
(1) Negligence is any conduct, except conduct recklessly or
wantonly disregardful of an interest of others, which falls below
the standard established by law for the protection of others against
unreasonable risk of harm. ' The standard of conduct chosen is
that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.
(2) Negligent conduct may be either:
(a) an act which the actor as a reasonable man should
realize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of
an interest of another, or
- (b) a failure, to do an act which is necessary for the
protection or assistance of another and which the actor is under a
duty to do.
This formula has been of innmense practical value in the de-
termination of negligence cases on the civil side of the docket.
But judges and juries have had no such standard to follow on
the criminal side.' 0 2 No Chief Justice Tindall s0 3 or Baron
AldersonI o- has pointed the way here.
" "But since it is impossible to anticipate the innumerable com-
binations of circumstances which may arise, it is impossible for the
law to formulate in advance definite standards by which the pro-
priety of conduct under every conceivable set of circumstances may
be judged. It can at best announce broad general principles, which
give the materials and general directions for the construction of
the standard to be applied in each particular case." Bohlen, Mixed
Questions of Law and Fact (1923) 72 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 111, 113.
1"'Restatement, Torts (1934) secs. 282-284.
'Note that the definition excludes reckless or wanton conduct.
See Restatement, Torts (1934) sec. 282, comment d, and Special
Note on page 740. The definition in the Restatement does not differ-
entiate between "reckless" and "wanton" conduct, excepting only
"conduct recklessly disregardful," but.the words are not synonymous
and the difference between them has been used later in this paper
to distinguish the degrees of negligence required for manslaughter
and murder.
"0 "Every judge has endeavored to find out a crisp, clear defi-
nition that will assist judges like myself in instructing jurors, and
every judge has, I think, failed. And I think the most conspicuous
-failure of all is that given in the close of the book from which Mr.
Johnston (counsel, for the prisoner) has quoted-Lord Halsbury's
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The lack of a formula for crmninal negligence has been due,
in part, to the passive submission of judges to the difficulties of
the situation. Too readily have they admitted their inability to
define or describe it.105
This attitude has been partially responsible for the failure
to determine just what are the fundamental problems involved
and to find some solution for them. For example, although fre-
quent references to the "ordinary prudent man" will be found
in criminal cases,1 0 6 judges have not frankly faced the issue
whether criminal negligence is objective or subjective. Negli-
gence on the civil side is objective as far as possible.10 7 The
ordinary prudent man is an objective abstraction, has he been
conscionsly used as such in the criminal cases ?
Presumably the courts have answered this question in their
enunciation of the now familiar rule that civil and criminal
negligence are the same in kind,'0 s they differ only in degree.10 9
Laws of England, Volume 9, page 582." Rex v. Murphy, 49 Ir.
L.T. 15, 16 (1915).
1 See his opinion in Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bingham's New
Cases, 468 (1837).
'The definition of negligence which is most frequently quoted
is taken in large part from his opinion in Blythe v. Birmingham,
11 Exchequer 781 (1856).
10 Turner, supra, note 21, at 40.
'Fitzgerald v. State, 112 Ala. 34, 20 So. 966 (1896); People
v. Marcom, - Cal. - , 5 P (2d) 974 (1931); Belk v. People,
125 ll. 584, 17 N.E. 744 (1888), State v. Hardie, 47 Iowa 647 (1878),
State v. Warner, 157 Iowa 124, 137 N.W 466 (1912), State v. Nevils,
330 Mo. 831, 51 S.W (2d) 47 (1932), Com. v. Breth, 44 Pa. Co. Ct.
56 (1915). See Note (1937) 6 Fordham L. Rev. 311, fn. 11.
'See pp. 32-33, infra.
I "The social purpose underlying the requirement of compen-
sation to the person harmed is not identical with that which forms
the basis of punishment. Conceivably, therefore, the standard
adopted in the criminal law of negligence might be entirely differ-
ent from that used in civil cases. This is not exactly the answer
since the 'measuring stick' here, as well as there, is the conduct of a
reasonable man under like circumstances. But whereas the civil
law requires conformity to this standard, a very substantial devia-
tion is essential to criminal guilt." Perkins, Rationale of Mens Rea
(1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 905, 914-915. And see Miller on Criminal
Law (1934) 66.
"Between criminal negligence, however, and actionable negli-
gence, there is no principle of discrimination, but a question of degree
only." Nail v. State, 33 Okla. Cr. 111, 242 Pac. 270, 272 (1925),
citing Bevan on Negligence.
11 "It is 'uniformly held,' said the Florida court, that the kind
of negligence required to impose crimnal guilt, 'must be of a higher
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However; it may be doubted whether. the judges are fully aware
of the import of their words as used in this rule. By stating
that the two are the same in kind, they are, m effect, admitting
that the criminal standard is also objective, and that culpability,
as the term is popularly used, has no part in determining crin-
inality in negligence cases.
*Whether the courts understand its implications or not, the
rule that civil and criminal negligence differ only in degree
raises the second major problem which has been inadequately
treated in the decisions. How are judges and juries to know
when this "higher degree" which would make the defendant
criminally liable is reached 9
While the distinction between the negligence which is suf-
ficient ground for a civil action and the "higher degree" winch
is necessary in criminal cases is sharply insisted upon, a test by
which the judge or jury might determine just when the higher
degree has been reached has by no means been made clear.
In attempting to describe this higher degree of negligence,
certain "vivid adjectives" 1 1 0 are commonly used in connection
with the word negligence. For example, "gross," 1 1 1 "crimn-
nal,"11 2  "culpable," 113  "clear," 114  "complete," 11 5  "wil-
degree than that required to establish simple negligence upon a
mere civil issue. " Perkins, supra, note 108, at 914-915.
'While the kind of negligence required to impose criminal lia-
bility has been described in different terms in different jurisdic-
tions, it is uniformly held that it must be of a higher degree than
that required to establish simple negligence upon a mere civil
issue." Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 107 So. 360, 363 (1926).
"Negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary care. Gross
negligence may consist in the failure to exercise any or very slight
care So we may truly say that negligence differs only in
degree." Johnson v. State, 66 Ohio St. 69, 63 N.E. 607, 609 (1902)
And see State v. Cope, 204 N.C. 28, 167 S.E. 456 (1933), Copeland
v. State, 154 Tenn. 7, 285 S.W 565 (1926), 29 C.J. 1154 (citing
cases)
. Turner, Mens Rea and Motorzsts (1935) 5 Camb. L. J. 61, 64.
m Held v. Com., 183 Ky 209, 215, 208 S.W 772, 775 (1919),
Jones v. Com., 213 Ky 356, 359, 281 S.W 164, 166 (1926), R. v.
Markuss, 4 F & F. 356, 359 (1864), Rex v. Allen, 7 C. & P 153, 164
(1835)
1 Carbo v. State, 4 Ga. App. 583, -, 62 S.E. 140, 140 (1908);
Schultz v. State, 89 Neb. 34, -, 130 N.W 972, 977 (1911); State
v. Goertz, 83 Conn. 437, -, 76 Atl. 1000, 1002 (1910); State v.
Irvine, 126 La. 434, - 52 So. 567, 569 (1910), R. v. Elliott, 16
Cox, C. C. 710, 714" (1889).
.eState v. Lester, 127 Minn. 282, - , 149 N.W 297, 298 (1914);
Nail v. State, 33 Okla. Cr. 100, 242 Pac. 270, 272 (1926); R. v.
Doherty, 16 Cox, C. C. 306, 309 (1887)
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ful,,"116 and "wanton," 117 are often employed. And the
"vituperative epithet" of Baron Rolfe 8s is found literally in
the use of "wicked" as an aid in determining the degree of negli-
gence necessary for criminal liability These help little. They
are not used in their dictionary sense, often far from it, but as
"vague adjectives, "119 straws flung to jurors drowning in a sea
of uncertainty by judges floundering in like waters. Formless,
without substance, they offer small relief.
Words grown to phrases are more helpful but still not satis-
fying. In People v. Goertz,1 20 the court held that the defendant
must be guilty of "recklessness of conduct, gross or wanton care-
lessness, " importing a "thoughtless disregard for consequences."
People v Adams12 1 describes the standard as "negligence that
borders on recklessness," "positive disregard of the rules of
diligence" and "reckless heedlessness of consequences." In
State v. Dorsey 1 2 2 the phrase, "wanton or reckless disregard of
the rights and safety of others" is used. Dozens of similar
phrases may be found in the decisions. In England, it is neces-
sary that the negligence of the accused go "beyond a mere mat-
ter of compensation between subjects", it must show "such dis-
regard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime
against the State and conduct deserving punishment. "123
'R. v. Macleod, 12 Cox, C. C. 534, 538 (1874)
1R. v. Noakes, 4 F & F 920, 921 (1866).
"'People v. Swartz, 298 Ill. 218, -, 131 N.E. 806, 808 (1921).
""People v. Adams, 289 Ill. 339, -, 124 N.E. 575, 577 (1919),
People v. Herkless, 361 Ill. 32, - , 196 N.E. 829, 833 (1925); Jones
v. Com., 213 Ky. 356, 360, 281 S.W 164, 167 (1926)
1 "1 said I could see no difference between negligence and gross
negligence-that it was the same thing, with the addition of a
vituperative epithet." Rolfe, B., in Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W 113,
115-116 (1843) (Italics ours).
"'Turner, supra, note 21, at 38.
183 Conn. 437, -, 76 Atl. 1000, 1002 (1910)
-289 Ill. 339, -, 124 N.E. 575, 577 (1919).
- 118 Ind. 167,-, 20 N.E. 777, 778 (1889).
LRex v. Bateman, 19 Cr. App. Rep. 8, 11-12 (1925), Andrews
v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1937) A.C. 576, 582-583.
Recent Canadian cases have followed the standard prescribed
in Rex v. Bateman. The language in individual cases is interesting.
"I think the great weight of authority goes to show that there will
be no criminal liability unless there is gross negligence, or wanton
misconduct. To constitute crime, there must be a certain moral
quality carried into the act before it becomes culpable. In each
case it is a question of fact; and it is the duty of the Court to
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There is little in either the English or American decision
to offer aid in describing the.degree of negligence necessary fot
crininal liability other than these, or similar, vivid adjectives
and vague phrases. Small wonder that, as Mr. Turner points
out, "in some cases the attempt to elucidate the principles to be
applied is abandoned and the question of what is to be done
with the person in the dock is handed over to the jury, who are
left, without any proper guidance, to come to a decision under
any chance influence that may happen to be operating at the
moment in their minds-even such as may be aroused by the
personal appearance of the prisoner, his calling, demeanor, or
social position.'' 124
ascertain if there was such wanton and reckless negligence as in
the eye of the law merits punishment. This may be found where
a general intention to disregard the law is shown or a reckless dis-
regard of the rights of others." Rex. v. Greisman, 4 D.L.R. 738,
743, 46 Can. C.C. 172 (1926) Note the similarity between the
language here and the phrase "conduct deserving punishment" in
the Bateman case.
"Whether the negligence in any case is of such a character as to
justify conviction upon a criminal charge must depend upon the
particular facts of the case itself. In order to found a criminal
charge, there must be present such a degree of want o' care as to
involve a moral element; such a wanton or reckless indifference
as to the lives and safety of others, as would lead one to say 'The
State should punish that man."' Rex v. Baker, 1 D.L.R. 785,
792-793, 51 Can. C.C. 71 (1929)
"In reference to manslaughter by negligence the legal and
popular meanings of the word are nearly identical as far as the
popular meaning goes; but an order that negligence may be culpable
it must be of such a nature that the jury think that a person who
caused death by it ought to be punished; in other words, it must
be of such a nature that the person guilty of it might and ought to
have known that neglect in that particular would, or probably might,
cause appreciable positive danger to life or health, and whether
this was so or not must depend upon the circumstances of each par-
ticular case." 2 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England
(1883) 123. The opinion in Rex v Bateman does not mention
this source but the similarity in language and thought is striking.
I Turner, supra note 21, at 40. The same idea, expressed with
less apprehension, is found in the following extract from an opinion
by Dodd, J..
"Negligence is entirely a question of degree. Some judges say
'gross negligence,' other judges put it in Latin and say 'crassa
negligentia.' That does not convey to my mind any kind of mean-
ing. There is a negligence that can be met and amply met by dam-
ages, and there is a negligence that cannot be amply met by dam-
ages, because it goes against the public. Who is to draw the line?
Can any judge supply a scientific definition? There is none such
that I can find in any reported case. Where the breach of duty that
ends in damages and where the other that ought to be punished
as an offense against the public begins, is for the jury an the box.
Is this an offense for which the accused ought to be criminally pun-
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It becomes apparent that the criminal cases do -not offer a
solution to the problem of determining what is criminal negli-
gence. One must turn elsewhere, if he is to obtain substantial
assistance.
B. THE PRoPOsrD DEFINITION
The logical place to turn for aid is to the civil cases where
a satisfactory formula for negligence is already in operation. It
is believed that this definition might serve as a base for a defim-
tion of negligence in the criminal field. With this premise in
mind, the following formula for criminal negligence is
suggested :125
(1) Criminal negligence is conduct creating such an un-
reasonable risk of harm to life, safety, property or other interest
for the unintentional invasion of which the law prescribes punish-
ment, as to be recklessly disregardful of such interest. T ' The stand-
ard of conduct to be applied is that of a reasonable man under like
circumstances.L-
(2) Criminally negligent conduct may be either:
(a) An act which the actor as a reasonable man should
realize as involving under the circumstances a reckless disre-
gard of an interest of others, or
(b) A failure to perform a legal duty which the actor as
a reasonable man should realize amounts to a reckless disre-
gard for human life and safety under the circumstances.
ished? Is it an offense for which he ought to go to gaol? Is this
an offense for which his employer ought to pay damages, and might
that end it? 'Can you assist us in that, judge?' No! It is the
glory of the country that it is twelve men who have to decide upon
the crimmality of their fellows, and not a judge." Rex. v. Murphy,
49 Ir. L.T. 16 (1914).
'See Restatement, Torts (1934) secs. 282-284 and comments
and Perkins, supra note 108, at 913-915.
'-'Wanton conduct is not included in the phrase "recklessly
disregardful." See fn. 101, supra.
M It should be pointed out that there is no particular efficacy
in the exact words and phrases used in the suggested formula. The
civil formula is variously stated in the cases and texts and the word-
mg in the Restatement is a new and more or less novel one. The
same fundamental idea can be expressed in a number of ways.
For example, The Restatement points out that the phrase, "con-
duct involving unreasonable risk" is substantially synonymous with
the phrases, "unduly dangerous conduct" and "unreasonably dan-
gerous conduct." Restatement, Torts, op. cit. supra note 100, at
sec. 282, comment b.
Consequently, a number of alternate definitions of criminal neg-
ligence, all worded somewhat differently but substantially alike,
may be formulated. For example:
Criminal negligence is such unreasonably dangerous con-
duct that the actor as an ordinary prudent man should realize
it involves, considering the circumstances, a reckless disregard
for the legally protected interests of others.
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This formula ties up criminal and civil negligence deft-
nitely, using so far as possible, the language in the Restatement
of Torts, as the common measure of expression. If civil and
criminal negligence are the same m lnnd, there are distinct ad-
vantages in such common statement. It facilitates their develop-
ment along parallel lines, so far as that is expedient, and makes
studies and judicial opinions in either field of substantial value
in the other.
The formula, like all others, may be criticised. It is diffi-
cult to frame the principles of negligence in a few sentences.
"The abstractions of t~ie law are hard to handle. '"12 s Never-
theless, the formula brings to the surface the most inportant
problems in criminal negligence. The first of these is presented
by the enunciation that negligence is "conduct," the second
by the attempt to describe the "higher degree" of negligence
necessary for criminal liability by stating that conduct to be
criminal must create such an unreasonable risk of harm as to
be "recklessly disregardful" of an interest of others. Of
course, the concepts, "conduct" and "recklessly disregardful"
must be broken down in order that they may be intelligently
applied to individual cases. The abstract statement of a formula
is only the first step in a long process.
The standard of conduct chosen in the criminal formula,
as in the civil, is that of "a reasonable man under like circum
stances. "129 The phrase, "reasonable man," is synonymous
I Green, op. cit. supra note 97, at 1031, n. 5. "Concepts whether
vague or precise are imperiled by the very words to wich they
are intrusted. Any adequate science of law awaits a science of
statement. The definitions of scholars are sieves, the opinions of
judges little more than a succession of mirages, even the preced-
ents by wnch the course of judicial decision is determined are
equally expansible and collapsible. But analysis and classification
are indispensable. Though they retard the very progress they would
promote, they are nevertheless the machinery through which the
law and lawyers function. They are the most reliable aids to pass-
ing judgment, but they cannot take the place of judgment." Ibid.
I "It is contended that the question ought to have been whether
the defendant had acted honestly and bona ftde to the best of his
own judgment. That, however, would leave so vague a line as to
afford no rule at all, the degree of judgment belonging to each
individual being infinitely various.
cc Instead, therefore, of saying that the liability for negli-
gence should be coextensive with the judgment of each individual,
which would be as variable as the length of the foot of each indi-
vidual, we ought rather to adhere to the rule, which requires in
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with the well known "ordinary prudent man,"'
30 commonly
used in the cases.
The selection of a standard so strict as to condemn conduct
not considered blameworthy according to the general opinion
of the community would be not only harsh and unpopular,
13 1
it would be illogical. It is true that some people are more
cautious than the "average." Such individuals hesitate to take
risks commonly accepted without question by the ordinary per-
son. It might be argued that they are more desirable citizens
because of their additional prudence, but tbis may well be
doubted. A certain amount of risk is utilitarian.
On the other hand, there are -individuals, less cautious than
the average person, who go through life taking risks, often with
no feeling of soctal culpability, that "a reasonable man" would
not think of incurring. Frequently such persons are danger-
creating without relation to the matter of utility, taking undue
risks for no good reason. Their "governors" (to take an
analogy from the realm of mechanics) function at a higher
all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence
would observe." Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. New Cas. 468 (1837).
"Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do." Blyth v. Birmingham
Waterworks Co., 11 Exch. 781, 784 (1856).
See the following crimial cases: Fitzgerald v. State, 112 Ala.
34, 20 So. 966 (1896); People v. Marconi, - Cal. - , 5 P (2d) 974
(1931); Belk v. People, 125 Ill. 584, 17 N.E. 744 (1888); State v.
Hardie, 47 Iowa 647 (1878); State v. Warner, 157 Iowa 124, 137
N.W 466 (1912) State v. Nevils, 330 Mo. 831, 51 S.W (2d) 47 (1932);
Com. v. Breth, 44 Pa. Co. Ct. 56 (1915).
"'"Pollock defines the standard as 'the foresight and caution
of a prudent man-the average prudent man.' Pollock, Torts (12th
ed. 1923) 444; Harper, Torts (1933) 159 as the 'ordinary reasonably
prudent man' which he says is 'a pure fiction'; in Lundy v Tel.
Co., 90 S.C. 25, 72 S.E. 558, 564 (1911), it is 'a person of ordinary
intelligence and prudence'; in Arkansas and La. R.R. v. Sanders, 81
Ark. 604, 99 S.W 1109 (1907), a 'reasonably prudent man'; in Keith
v. Worcester and Blackstone St. Ry., 196 Mass. 478, 82 N.E. 680
(1907), a man 'reasonably prudent and careful'; in Davis v. Con-
cord and Montreal R.R., 68 N.H. 247, 44 Atl. 388 (1895), a 'person of
average prudence.'" Note (1939) 28 Ky L. J. 237-239.
1 "A law which punished conduct which would not be blame-
worthy in the average member of the community would be too severe
for that community to bear.' Holmes, The Common Law (1881) 50.
"The first requirement of a sound body of law is that it should
correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the community,
whether right or wrong." Id, at 41. And see Wechsler and Michael,
supra note 76, at 749, especially fn. 172.
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"speed" (risk) than those of ordinary persons. Under circum-
stances where the average operator would drive an automobile at
50 miles an hour they habitually drive at 60 or higher. The tak-
ing of this added and unusual risk comes to them naturally,-
they do not intend to be reckless in their conduct.
The norm of conduct has been placed somewhere between
the two extremes. The "average" person in the community
has been selected. 13 2 Such a "person" is, of course, a pure
fiction. He does not exist. Nevertheless, in practice, the
formula works out fairly well. If it is applied by a jury, "a
slice of the community," they are apt to draw a "composite
picture" of a reasonable man in their deliberations which rep-
resents with reasonable exactitude the standard of the com-
munity If the formula is employed by the court in passing
upon a demurrer or other pleading, there is a likelihood that
the judge, who is also selected from the community, will be able
to envisage an ordinary prudent man who is representative of
the standard to be applied.
1. THE OBJECTIVITY oF NEGLIGENCE
It can be seen that the definition of crininal negligence
which has been suggested makes no provision for the state of
mind of the actor. To the extent that negligence is regarded
as unreasonably dangerous conduct, and conduct is evaluated
with reference to an abstraction (a reasonable man under like
circumstances), an objective standard is applied.1 3 3 Although
negligence may and generally does result from a careless state
"'The reasonableness of the danger and the care and caution
necessary to avoid it are to be determined, not by reference to any
individual or group of individuals, but by reference to the assumed
'average' person-the 'ordinary reasonably prudent man.' This, of
course, is a pure fiction. Any judgment of what is 'reasonable' must
be some person's judgment. What is sought is a judgment which,
as far as possible, represents the general level of moral judgment
of the community. Not the judgment of the most cautious nor the
most reckless, but a judgment winch, to use another fiction, will
fairly represent the social or community notion of what is right,
sensible and proper." Harper, Law of Torts (1933) 158-159.
m'See State v. Pickus, 63 S.D. 257, 257 N.W 284, 293 (1934),
where the court, in defining the standard, said:
"Negligence, of course, is a failure to comply with an objective
standard-the failure to exercise such degree of care as would be
exercised under the circumstances by a reasonably prudent man."
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of innd,1 34 the mental element is not material. 135 Courts
approach the problem objectively by mqmrmg whether the
actor's behavzor was such as to meet the standard which society
has prescribed.1 36
'The same result is reached in most cases whether the con-
duct theory or the mental theory is followed. "I have found
few cases in which the conduct view has clearly led to a result that
could not have been reached on the basis of the mental view."
Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence and Indifference: The Relation
of Mental States to Negligence (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 854.
"Jurisprudence is not psychology, and law disregards many
psychological distinctions not because lawyers are ignorant of their
existence, but because it is impracticable or useless to regard them.
Even if the terms were used by lawyers in a peculiar. sense, there
would be no need for apology; but the legal sense is the natural
one. Negligence is the contrary of diligence, and no one describes
diligence as a state of mind. The question for judges and juries is
not what a man was thinking or not thinking about, expecting or
not expecting, but whether his behavior was or was not such as we
demand of a prudent man under the given circumstances." Pollock,
op cit. supra note 130, at 443. The entire discussion, pp. 442-447,
is illuminating.
"In either case one never gets to the mental state of the actor.
One gets only to objective factors, which seem to indicate the ex-
istence of a mental state. The entire method of procedure is ob-
jective. The subjective aspects may be talked about, but they are
never actually reached." Levitt, Extent and Function of the Doctrine
of Mens Rea (1923) 17 Ill. L. Rev. 578, 589.
The most striking indication that no blameworthy state of mind
is necessary to establish criminal liability is found in such cases as
Com. v. Breth, 44 Pa. C.C. 56 (1916) In that case the father of a
five-months-old child, knowing that the child was dangerously ill,
refused to provide medical attention for it, under the belief that
prayer was all that was necessary. In pursuance of this belief, he
and others resorted to prayer for the child's recovery, but it died.
The father was convicted of involuntary manslaughter.
In such cases the courts apply the familiar principle that
religious conviction is not an excuse for a failure to meet the ob-
3ective standards enforced by the community. Where such mdi-
wduals are motivated conscientiously, it is difficult to work out
any subjective blameworthiness,---if a Christian nation actually
believes what it professes. See Lee, Liability of Parent at Common
Law on Charge of Manslaughter for Negligently Omitting to Fur-
nish Medical Attendance to Child Because of Religious Disbelief
in the Efficacy of Medicine (1902) 44; note on Com. v. Breth (1916)
65 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 88; Sayre, Cases on Criminal Law (1927) 176,
fn. 1.
'Edgerton, supra note 134, at 849; Restatement, Torts, op. cit.
supra note 100, at sec. 282; Harper, op. cit. supra note 132, at sec.
68; Holmes, op. cit. supra note 131, at 49-50; May's Criminal Law
(4th ed. 1938) secs. 24-28.
It was to this that Cardozo had reference when he stated:
"Negligence as a term of legal art is, strictly speaking, a mis-
nomer, for negligence connotes to the ordinary man the notion of
lack of care, and yet one can be negligent in the view of the law
though one has taken what one has supposed to be extraordinary
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The accentuation upon the objective in negligence is occa-
sioned by the fact that the law is primarily interested in mam-
taming the general security, not in awarding punshnent for
blameworthy mental attitudes.
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The view that criminal negligence, like civil, is unreason-
ably dangerous conduct rather than an indifferent state of mind,
is, of course, at variance with the popular conception that some
sort of mens rea is a necessary ingredient of every crime at
care, and not negligent though one has taken no care at all. More-
over, one can deliberately choose to be indifferent to the greatest
peril, and yet avoid the charge of negligence for all one's scorn of
prudence.
"Two factors, both social, contribute to the paradox. The first
is the conception of the 'reasonable man,' the man who conforms in
conduct to the common standards of society If the individual falls
short of the standards of the group, he does so at his peril. He
must then answer for his negligence though his attention never
flagged. Enough that a reasonable man would have appreciated the
peril which because of stupidity or ignorance may have been hidden
to the actor By and large with whatever allowance may
be made for deviation or exception, the test of liability is external
and objective." Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928)
72-74.
Precisely the same idea is expressed by Edgerton as follows:
"The proposition that negligence is conduct means that there
is negligence if there are unreasonably dangerous motions, and not
otherwise; consequently, that no particular mental shortcoming
proves negligence or is necessary to negligence, and no particular
mental attainment precludes negligence. Non-negligent conduct,
and consequent freedom from liability, may coexist with a mental
state that is dangerous, as involving madvertence, lack of normal
anxiety to avoid harm, or any other unsafe mental fact; negligent
conduct, and consequent liability, may coexist with normal and
proper advertence and anxiety." Edgerton, supra, at 854.
3 " the ani of the law is not to punish sms, but is to pre-
vent certain external results " Holmes, J., in Com. v. Ken-
nedy, 170 Mass. 18, 48 N.E. 770 (1897).
"Our modern objective tends more and more in the direction, not
of awarding adequate punishment for moral wrong-domg, but of
protecting social and public interests. To the extent that this ob-
jective prevails, the mental element requisite for criminality, if
not altogether dispensed with, is coming to mean, not so much a mind
bent on evil-doing, as an intent to do that which unduly endangers
social and public interests." Sayre, supra note 4, at 1017.
"Liability (in negligence) is now apportioned to the degree
of risk to life and limb created, rather than to the moral delin-
quencies of the defendant. The crimes of murder, manslaughter,
and assault and battery are being used m an attempt to control
the reckless use of dangerous instrumentalities which modern
inventions have intrusted to unskilled hands, in addition to their
older function of punishing intended injuries." Hall, The Sub-
stantive Law of Crzmes (1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 616, 642.
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common law.' 8s In rendering homage to the supposed neces-
sity of mens rea,1 39 however, it has frequently been necessary
for judges and writers to resort to a number of questionable
expedients, commonly classified under the somewhat anomalous
heading, "constructive intent."
In the case of negligence, some courts have said that the
law infers intention from reckless conduct;140 others, that a
person is presumed to intend all the natural and probable con-
sequences of is acts.14 1 One device is to say that negligence
zmplies intent.14 2 A hardly less satisfactory expression is that
negligence supplies the necessary intent.
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The fundamental objection to all these explanations is that
they cloud the issue. If "intent" as used in them has any
meaning, it is a conveniently esoteric one. Resort to such
fictions may have been justified when an evil mind was con-
sidered a requisite element of crime, but, today, with a widen-
'This doctrine dates from the latter part of the twelfth cen-
tury. It is then for the first time that a real emphasis upon the
mental element in crime is found. As Sayre points out, this was
largely due to two strong forces. The resuscitated Roman law
with its emphasis upon dolus and culpa stressed the psychical ele-
ment in criminal liability Bracton, the first great English law
writer, was to borrow liberally from it in the next century. The
second force was the canon law with its persistent and relentless
accent upon moral guilt. See Sayre, supra note 4, at 982; 2 Pollock
& Maitland, op cit. supra note 1, at 477.
It was due directly to the influence of the canon law that the
phrase "mens rea" was first used. It is found in the middle of
Leges Henrici. This book contains many survivals of the earlier
period of absolute liability. And yet, in the middle of such rules
holding a man responsible for his acts, regardless of intent, in a
discussion of perjury, is found, "reum non facit nst mens rea."
A number of writers have followed Maitland in showing that the
phrase goes back to St. Augustine. 2 Pollock & Maitland, op cit supra
note 1, at 476, fn. 5. See Levitt, The Origin of the Doctrine of Mens
Rea (1922) 17 Ill. L. Rev 117. Once in a "book of the law" the
phrase stuck tenaciously and attained a position of dominating in-
fluence in the criminal law.
'There are recognized exceptions to the requirement of mens
rea. See Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 55;
May, op cit. supra note 136, at 3, fn. 18; id. at sec. 38.
"0Pool v. State, 87 Ga. 526, 13 S.E. 556 (1891) See Clark and
Marshall on Crimes (3rd ed. 1927) sec. 51.
"'State V Barnard, 88 N.C. 661 (1883).
"'-Hampton v. State, 45 Ala. 82 (1871)
"Com. v. Hawkins, 157 Mass. 551, 32 N.E. 862 (1893), Fitz-
gerald v. State, 112 Ala. 34, 20 So. 966 (1895), State v. Barnard, 88
N.C. 661 (1883).
"Negligence is one way of supplying a sufficient criminal in-
tent to make a crimial act punishable." Note (1899) 12 Harv. L.
Rev. 428. See Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake %n the Criminal Law
(1908) 22 Harv. L. Rev. 75, 83.
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ng use of non-mens-rea crimes,1 4 4 this requirement is :not as
important as it was.14 5 The modern'objective tends more and
more toward the "societal harm" of the act and less and less
toward the moral wrongdoing of the defendant m the detern-
nation of substantive guilt.1 4 6  Consequently, such misnomers
as "constructive intent" are falling into disfavor.
It is believed that, excluding the negligent murder, a blame-
worthy mental state is not essential to criminal liability in neg-
'Hall, supra note 137, at 652; Sayre, supra note 4, at 1017.
The general trend toward the objective is indicated, also, by
the increase in statutes creating liability on the doing of a pro-
hibited act, regardless of intent. For example: "The doing of the
inhibited act constitutes the crime and the moral turpitude or
purity of the motive by which it was prompted and knowledge or,
ignorance of its criminal character are nmaterial circumstances
on the question of guilt." Com. v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 93 N.E.
249 (1910).
' "These two standards, the objective and the subjective, have
been our crimial law since the thirteenth century. They have
existed, side by side, at times without clashmg, at times in close
conflict. The objective view, however, has gradually been gaming
the ascendancy. At the present-time I think the subjective aspect
is practically eliminated as an element of any specific crime, and
maintains whatever hold it has because of the idea that a crime is
an act for which the offender must be punished. This idea is tied
up with the notion that punishment should not be inflicted upon
one who did not act as a free moral agent and who did not possess
the will to evil which is the central idea of the classical theory of
punishment. Modern criminology, however, while not ignoring the
will to evil, is not interested in it as a metaphysical speculation
or as a test for determining a future state of bliss or misery. It
looks at the evil will as a psychological and sociological phenomenon.
Naturally, then, where the classicist thought of punishment the
modernist thinks of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Our criminal
law, while concerned, practically unwittingly, with freeing itself
from domination by Augustiman metaphysics, has reached a point
where, to my mind, it is ready and able to re-adopt the objective
standard for determining whether a crime has been committed or
not, and, at the same time, accept the aid of the modern crimnolo-
gist in utilizing the subjective standard when punishments are to
be imposed." Levitt, supra note 135, at 578.
" "Indeed, the strong current of modern decisions toward ap-
plying in the criminal law an ob3ective standard, to which all must
measure up at their peril, in place of the older subjective standard,
under which defendants are punishable only for failing to measure
up to their own capacities, is only another manifestation of the
same trend of the crimial law. Certain it is that in modern times
we have moved far from" the old fourteenth century conception of
mens rea as a mind bent on moral wrongdoing." Sayre, supra note
4, at 1019.
"If intent means anything in these cases it is. merely a two-
syllabled method of expressing conveniently a set of operative
facts. Defendant, then, in case two is held guilty on the unex-
pressed assumption that such conduct is more dangerous to society
than the conduct of the defendant in case. three, and that, conse-
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ligence.1 4 7 The real criterion is whether the accused has met
the standard of conduct which the law has prescribed.1 48 To
say that the actor is presumed to have intended the conse-
quences of his negligent conduct, or to snfer,1 49 as a matter of
law a blameworthy mental state from the circumstances, is to
disguise the truth. What the law really does is to disregard
the mental state,1 50 except in the case of the negligent mur-
quently, more benefit is to be derived-by punishing the former de-
fendant than the latter." Tulin, The Role of Penalties zn Criinnal
Law (1927) 37 Yale L. J. 1046, 1055.
" 'Pollock, Mr Justice Holmes (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 693, 694.
See Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (1922) 177-
179. Mr. Pound is speaking here of civil negligence but it is sub-
mitted that the discussion is equally applicable to criinal negli-
gence.
',9 "But what the law is really regarding is not his culpable
exercise of his will but the danger to the general security if he and
his fellows act affirmatively without coming up to the standard
imposed to maintain that security If he acts he must measure up
to that standard at his peril of answering for injurious consequences.
Wherever a case of negligence calls for sharp application of the
objective standard, fault is as much a dogmatic fiction as is repre-
sentation in the liability of the master for the torts of his servant.
In each case the exigencies of the will theory lead us to cover up
a liability irrespective of fault, imposed to maintain the general
security, by a conclusive imputation of fault to one who may be
normally blameless. Pound, op cit. supra note 147, at 178-179.
"It is familiar law that an act causing death may be murder,
manslaughter, or misadventure, according to the degree of danger
attending it. If the danger is very great it is murder The
very meaning of the fiction of implied malice in such cases at com-
mon law was, that a man rnght have to answer with his life for
consequences which he neither intended nor foresaw. To say that
he was presumed to have intended them, is merely to adopt another
fiction, and to disguise the truth. The truth was, that his failure
or inability to predict them was immaterial, if, under the circum-
stances known to him, the court or jury, as the case might be,
thought them obvious." Holmes, J., in Com. v. Pierce, 138 Mass.
165, 178 (1884).
'This is the most logical basis for a support of the subjective
theory of crimial negligence. While plausible in most cases, it
breaks down in a number of situations. See, for example, the dis-
cussion of Com. v. Breth, supra note 135.
'As far as blameworthiness is concerned, is meant. There
are some physical and mental attributes which the law permits the
jury to consider. Green, op cit. supra note 97. "Reviewing the
whole matter briefly, it would appear that there is no standardized
man; that there is only in part an objective test; that there is no
such thing as reasonable or unreasonable conduct except as viewed
with reference to certain qualities of the actor-his physical attr-
butes, probably,--if superior, his intellectual powers, his knowledge
and the knowledge he would have acquired had he exercised stand-
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der,1 51 and look at the amount of danger in the conduct of the
accused when determining his guilt or innocence. Such a theory
of negligence is founded on blameworthiness no less than a sub-
jective one. The difference lies in the fact that the tests of
blameworthiness are external and "independent of the degree
of evil in the particular person's motives or intentions.' '152
(To be Continued)
ard moral and at least average mental qualities at the time of action
or at some connected time." Seavey, Negligence-Sub3ective or Ob-
2ective (1927) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 27.
This matter is discussed in more detail in this paper, infra.
'It is doubtful whether the common law judges carried the
law of murder so far along the line of externality. Wechsler and
Michael, supra note 76, at 710. Stephen believed that the accused
must have "knowledge" of the danger and not merely of the cir-
cumstances. 3 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 3, at 22. That remains
the law in England today Reg. v. Vamplew, 3 F & F 520 (1862).
See Turner, supra note 21, at 37-48. However, Holmes maintained
in his book on The Common Law and in a series of cases in which
he wrote the opinons that it is immaterial whether the accused
knew the danger if he was aware of circumstances that would
lead an ordinary prudent man to appreciate that the danger was
very great. Holmes, op cit. supra note 131, at 53-57; Com. v. Pierce,
138 Mass. 165, 178 (1884), Com. v Chance, 174 Mass. 245, 252,
54 N.E. 551, 554 (1899), The Germanic, 196 U.S. 589, 596, 41 L. ed.
610, 613 (1904), Nash v U.S., 229 U.S. 373, 377, 57 L. ed. 1232,
1235 (1913). See Note (1939) 28 Ky L. J. 53. The writer adopts
Stephen's view. See the discussion, infra.
The trend in the United States toward the objective theory
in negligence has been quite apparent in the case of assault and
battery. Practically all jurisdictions now recognize the negligent
battery This is usually accomplished by a strained interpretation
of "intent." See Com. v. Hawkins, 157 Mass. 551, 32 N.E. 862
(1893), Tilt v State, 17 Ga. App. 663, 88 S.E. 41 (1915), State v.
Schutte, 87 N.J.L. 15, 93 Atl. 112 (1915). See May, op cit. supra
note 136, at sec. 159.
Further discussion of the character of negligence in murder
and in assault and battery will be found, mfra.
It is omitted at this point in order to avoid repetition.
Holmes, op cit. supra note 131, at 50.
